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We introduce a new primitive for quantum communication that we term “state targeting” wherein
the goal is to pass a test for a target state even though the system upon which the test is performed
is submitted prior to learning the target state’s identity. Success in state targeting can be described
as having some control over the outcome of the test. We show that increasing one’s control above
a minimum amount implies an unavoidable increase in the probability of failing the test. This is
analogous to the unavoidable disturbance to a quantum state that results from gaining information
about its identity, and can be shown to be a purely quantum effect. We provide some applications of
the results to the security analysis of cryptographic tasks implemented between remote antagonistic
parties. Although we focus on weak coin flipping, the results are significant for other two-party
protocols, such as strong coin flipping, partially binding and concealing bit commitment, and bit
escrow. Furthermore, the results have significance not only for the traditional notion of security in
cryptography, that of restricting a cheater’s ability to bias the outcome of the protocol, but also
on a novel notion of security that arises only in the quantum context, that of cheat-sensitivity.
Finally, our analysis of state targeting leads to some interesting secondary results, for instance, a
generalization of Uhlmann’s theorem and an operational interpretation of the fidelity between two
mixed states.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that quantum theory allows for the
implementation of cryptographic tasks with a degree of
information-theoretic security that cannot be achieved
classically, with key distribution being the most famous
example [1]. Particularly interesting among these tasks
are the so-called “post-cold-war” applications of cryptog-
raphy, wherein two remote and mistrustful parties seek to
cooperate towards some end. Examples of these are bit
commitment [2, 3, 4], strong coin flipping [6, 8], weak coin
flipping [7], bit escrow [8], and two-party secure compu-
tation [9]. In this paper, we focus on elucidating a certain
primitive we have identified as accounting for the ability
of certain quantum two-party cryptographic protocols to
outperform their classical counterparts.
We begin by recalling a more familiar such primitive,
specifically state estimation [10]: A system is prepared
in one of a set of states, and passed on to an estimator.
Typically, the task of the estimator is to try, as best as
possible, to determine which of the states describes the
system. Imagine, however, that the estimator is asked
to announce his guess of the state and then is asked to
resubmit the system, which is subsequently subjected to
a pass/fail test for still being in the initially prepared
state. In this case, the estimator’s task is to guess the
state without disturbing it.1 By doing nothing to the sys-
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1 Since the definition of the task of state estimation does not typ-
ically make any reference to a disturbance, we prefer to refer to
such a primitive as state spying - it is discussed in more detail
in section IX
tem, the estimator can make a random guess and avoid
creating any disturbance. However, it is well known that
any interaction with the system that leads to a greater
probability of guessing correctly will necessarily also lead
to a disturbance of the state [11]. This phenomena is
extremely important - for instance, it underlies the pos-
sibility of quantum key distribution.
The focus of this paper is the task of passing a test for
a target state, even though the system upon which the
test is performed must be submitted prior to learning the
target state’s identity. We call this task state targeting.
State targeting is built of the same elements as the sort
of state estimation task just discussed: There is a system
and a set of states, one of which is distinguished. There
is also a classical announcement of a state drawn from
the specified set, and the most desirable announcement
is an announcement of the distinguished state. Finally,
there is a pass/fail test on the system. What is different
in state targeting is how these elements are organized,
and the fact that the person implementing the task (the
player) submits rather than receives the quantum system.
More explicitly, a state targeting task proceeds as fol-
lows. At the outset, there is an unknown target state,
drawn from a known set of states. The player submits a
system, and only after doing so does she learn the iden-
tity of the target state. At this point, the player must
announce a state from the original set (not necessarily the
target state), and the system is subjected to a pass/fail
test for the announced state. Success is defined as an-
nouncing the target state and subsequently passing the
test for this state.
The player can always make a random guess of the
target state initially, and thereafter announce this state
and be sure to pass the test for this state. This will lead
to some finite probability of announcing the target state
2while avoiding any risk of failing the final test. However,
it turns out that any attempt to make the probability of
announcing the target state greater than what is achieved
with this trivial scheme results in a non-zero probability
of failing the final test. This phenomena is analogous to
the unavoidable disturbance that comes with information
gain in state estimation. As one might expect, it too has
interesting applications in quantum cryptography.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section II, we
provide a simple cryptographic motivation for our study,
namely, a weak coin flipping(WCF) protocol wherein one
of the party’s cheating strategies is an instance of state
targeting. We also define the task of state targeting in
greater detail than has been done in the introduction. In
section III, we consider state targeting where the target
state is drawn uniformly from a pair of pure states. We
determine the maximum probability of success, and in-
vestigate the rate at which the probability of failing the fi-
nal test increases with the probability of success. Section
IV generalizes the notion of state targeting by allowing
for the possibility that the player simply declines from
announcing a state. This allows the player to achieve
some non-trivial degree of success without running any
risk of failing the final test. (This is analogous to the
fact that some information gain without disturbance be-
comes possible in state estimation if one has the option
to sometimes decline from resubmitting the system for
testing.) This variant of the state targeting task is also
shown to have a cryptographic motivation in terms of a
weak coin flipping protocol. In section V, we optimize
this variant in the case where the target state is drawn
uniformly from a pair of pure states.
In the second half of the paper, we consider state tar-
geting for mixed states. This requires a careful consider-
ation of what to use as a test for a mixed state, and so we
begin in section VI by addressing this question. In section
VII, we consider the success that can be achieved in state
targeting between a pair of mixed states, and in section
VIII, we examine the case where the player is allowed to
sometimes decline from being tested. Section IX refines
the analogy that exists between state targeting and state
estimation by focusing on a variant of state estimation,
which we call state spying, wherein the estimator must
resubmit the system for testing. We consider the appli-
cations of our results on state targeting and discuss some
open problems in section IX. Finally, in section X, we
consider the classical analogue of state targeting, which
highlights the inherently quantum mechanical features of
this task.
II. MOTIVATION AND DEFINITION OF STATE
TARGETING
To emphasize the importance of state targeting in
cryptography, and to motivate the sorts of problems that
we shall address, it is useful to have an example of a
protocol that makes use of this task. For this purpose,
we introduce a very simple protocol for the two-party
cryptographic primitive of weak coin flipping(WCF) [7]
[7]. Here, two separated and mistrustful parties wish to
engage in communication to generate a random bit, the
value of which will fix a winner and a loser, in such a way
that each party can be guaranteed that if they follow the
honest protocol, the other party is limited in the extent
to which they can bias the value of the bit in their favor.
The simple weak coin flipping protocol we consider
makes use of a pair of non-orthogonal pure states
|ψ0〉,|ψ1〉. If both parties are honest, it proceeds as fol-
lows.
Weak coin flipping protocol 1
1. Alice chooses a bit b uniformly from {0,1}, prepares
|ψb〉 and sends the system to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a bit b′ uniformly from {0,1} and an-
nounces it to Alice (one can think of this as Bob’s
guess of the value of b).
3. Alice announces b to Bob
4. Bob tests the system for being in the state |ψb〉.
If at step (4), the system fails Bob’s test, then Alice
is caught cheating. Otherwise, if b′ = b then Bob
wins, while if b′ 6= b, then Alice wins.
Alice may cheat by preparing the system in an arbi-
trary state of her choosing at step (1), and making what-
ever announcement she pleases at step (3). Bob may
cheat at step (2) by performing a measurement upon the
system, and using the outcome to inform his decision of
what b′ to announce. The extent to which Bob can cheat
when Alice is honest depends on the extent to which he
can correctly estimate which of a pair of non-orthogonal
states applies to the system, in order to make the best
possible guess of b and maximize his probability of mak-
ing b′ = b. The problem of state estimation has been
extensively studied, and consequently the solution can
be found in the literature [10, 11]. On the other hand,
the extent to which Alice can cheat when Bob is honest
depends on the extent to which she can pass a test for
the state opposite to the one Bob guessed, despite not
knowing what Bob’s guess will be when she submits the
system. We can state this as follows: her target state
is determined by Bob’s announcement, which only oc-
curs after she has submitted the system. This is a simple
instance of state targeting.
Note that Alice’s announcement in step (3) of the pro-
tocol determines what state Bob is to test for. Alice can
only win the coin flip if she announces a bit b that is
unequal to b′. However, if she announces b 6= b′ with-
out having initially prepared |ψb〉, then she runs a risk of
failing Bob’s test. Of course, Alice may sometimes prefer
to pass a test for the non-target state rather than failing
the test for the target state. As such, she may not always
ask Bob to test for the target state.
The task faced by a dishonest Alice in our simple WCF
protocol is just one instance of state targeting. More
generally, a state targeting task is defined as follows:
3(i) Alice submits a system to Bob.
(ii) Alice learns the identity of the target state.
(iii) Alice announces a state to Bob (not necessarily the
target state).
(iv) Bob performs a Pass/Fail test for the announced
state.
The possible outcomes are:
(A) Alice announces the target state and passes Bob’s
test
(B) Alice announces the target state and fails Bob’s test
(C) Alice announces a non-target state and passes
Bob’s test
(D) Alice announces a non-target state and fails Bob’s
test
“Success” in state targeting is to achieve outcome (A).
Thus, we can quantify the degree of success by the prob-
ability of this outcome. We call this probability Alice’s
control 2 We shall be interested in determining the max-
imum control achievable in state targeting.
There are several ways in which Alice might not suc-
ceed. In cryptographic applications, it is reasonable to
expect that failing one of Bob’s tests has a greater cost
than passing the test for a non-target state, since the
former indicates that Alice has cheated. Thus, it is use-
ful to consider the total probability of failing Bob’s test,
which is the sum of the probabilities for outcomes (B)
and (D). We call this probability Alice’s disturbance. It
is sometimes useful for Alice to sacrifice some control
to lower her disturbance. Thus, we shall be interested
in determining the minimal disturbance for a given con-
trol, which we refer to as the optimal control-disturbance
trade-off.
III. STATE TARGETING FOR TWO PURE
STATES
A. Maximum control
Consider the example of state targeting that is pro-
vided by our simple weak coin flipping protocol, namely,
one wherein the target is selected uniformly from a pair
of pure states, |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉. If Alice simply wishes to max-
imize her probability of announcing the target state and
passing Bob’s test, that is, if she is unconcerned about
2 Note that in the case of two target states with equal prior proba-
bility, our definition of this quantity coincides with the definition
used in Ref. [4] except that it is offset from the latter by a factor
of 1/2.
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FIG. 1: A slice of the Bloch sphere, showing the two possi-
ble target states, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. The state |ψM 〉 is the one
that Alice must submit to achieve her maximal control. If
she submits the state ρH , then she can achieve some non-
trivial control at the cost of some disturbance by steering to
a particular convex decomposition of the state prior to her
announcement. The pair of states |φ〉, |φ′〉 indicate the ele-
ments of a convex decomposition that Alice might use where
the target state is |ψ0〉. In general the optimal state to submit
in order to minimize her disturbance for a given control lies
between ρH and |ψM 〉.
the relative probabilities of outcomes (B),(C) and (D),
then she should always announce the target state. Her
most general strategy at step (i) is to prepare the system
in a (possibly mixed) state ρ. In this case, Alice’s control
is
C =
1
2
〈ψ0|ρ|ψ0〉+ 1
2
〈ψ1|ρ|ψ1〉. (1)
Noting that this can be rewritten as 12Tr(ρ(|ψ0〉〈ψ0| +|ψ1〉〈ψ1|), it is clear that the maximum control is simply
the maximum eigenvalue of |ψ0〉〈ψ0| + |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and is
achieved by choosing ρ to be the associated eigenvector.
Explicitly, the maximum control is
Cmax ≡ max
ρ
C =
1
2
(1 + |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|) (2)
and the state that achieves it is
|ψM 〉 ≡ N (|ψ0〉+ |ψ1〉), (3)
where N is a normalization factor, and the phases have
been chosen so that 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 is real.
Since the Hilbert space spanned by any pair of pure
states is two-dimensional, it can be represented using the
Bloch sphere picture. Within this picture, |ψM 〉 is repre-
sented by the point that lies halfway between the points
representing |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 on the geodesic that connects
them, as indicated in Fig. 1.
4B. The control-disturbance trade-off
By achieving her maximum control, Alice runs a risk of
failing Bob’s test. Since she always announces the target
state in this case, outcomes (C) and (D) never occur and
her probability of failing Bob’s test (her disturbance) is
simply the difference between 1 and her maximum con-
trol, that is, 12 (1−|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|). If, on the other hand, Alice
exerts her trivial control of 1/2 by preparing |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉
with equal probability and then announcing this state re-
gardless of the identity of the target state, she creates no
disturbance. We can imagine, however, that situations
may arise wherein Alice decides to achieve some non-
trivial but non-maximal control. It is useful therefore
to determine the minimal disturbance for every achiev-
able degree of control. Since we find that this function is
monotonically increasing, it also specifies the maximum
control for a given disturbance.
We begin by making the observation that a second
strategy for Alice which achieves the trivial control with
no disturbance is for her to couple the system she sends
to Bob with an ancilla that she keeps, thereby preparing
the entangled state
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ0〉+ |1〉|ψ1〉) . (4)
When it comes time to announce a state to Bob, she
simply measures the ancilla in the |0〉, |1〉 basis, registers
the bit value b of the outcome, and announces |ψb〉.
In this situation the reduced density operator for the
submitted system is ρH =
1
2 |ψ0〉〈ψ0| + 12 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|, which
is represented on the Bloch sphere by the point which lies
halfway along the line joining the points corresponding
to |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 - this is depicted in Fig. 1.
Alice can now use the following trick to increase her
control beyond the minimum value. Suppose Bob an-
nounces that the target state is |ψ0〉. Alice then imple-
ments a measurement on her ancilla of some basis dis-
tinct from the |0〉, |1〉 basis. This collapses the state of
the submitted system to |φ〉 with some probability q and
to |φ′〉 with probability (1 − q). An example is depicted
in Fig. 1. We assume that of the two states, |φ〉 has the
greater overlap with |ψ0〉 (as is the case in the figure), so
that Alice announces |ψ0〉 upon obtaining the outcome
associated with |φ〉, and she announces |ψ1〉 upon ob-
taining the outcome associated with |φ′〉. If the target
state is |ψ1〉, she exerts a similar strategy, collapsing the
state of the submitted system to a different pair of states,
|χ〉 or |χ′〉, with probabilities p and 1− p respectively.3
3 The possibility of influencing which of several convex decompo-
sitions describe the updating of the state of a remote system by
choosing which measurement to perform on a system with which
it is entangled is the key element of the EPR argument [12].
Schro¨dinger described this phenomena as steering the state of a
remote system [13]. We adopt this term, but are careful to avoid
By this strategy, Alice achieves a control of
C =
1
2
q|〈φ|ψ0〉|2 + 1
2
p|〈χ|ψ1〉|2. (5)
Her disturbance, which is her total probability of failing
Bob’s test, is
D =
1
2
[q(1− |〈φ|ψ0〉|2) + (1− q)(1− |〈φ′|ψ1〉|2]
+
1
2
[p(1− |〈χ|ψ1〉|2) + (1− p)(1− |〈χ′|ψ0〉|2] (6)
One might worry that of all the convex decompositions
of ρH , only some can be realized by performing a mea-
surement on the ancilla. If this were the case, then this
subset of convex decompositions would have to be char-
acterized before we could proceed with the optimization.
However, this is not a concern, because as is shown in
Refs. [13] and [14] (and generalized to non-extremal de-
compositions in [5]), every convex decompositions of a
mixed state can be achieved by some measurement on
the ancilla. Thus, we can vary over all convex decompo-
sitions with the assurance that there is a measurement
that will achieve it. Assuming |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are non-
orthogonal, ρH lies off the centre of the Bloch sphere,
and consequently |φ〉 and |φ′〉 (which define the convex
decomposition of ρH) can be chosen such that q > 1/2;
this follows from the fact that ρH is geometrically closer
to |φ〉 than to |φ′〉 in the Bloch sphere. Similarly, Alice
can ensure that p > 1/2. Despite the fact that Alice has
a non-unit probability of passing Bob’s test, her overall
probability of success can increase.
We do not expect that ρH will correspond to the opti-
mal ρ for every value of the control that Alice may wish to
achieve. Indeed, we already know that in order to achieve
her maximum control, she must submit a different state,
indicated by |ψM 〉 in Fig. 1. Thus we expect the opti-
mal ρ to be an interpolation between ρH and |ψM 〉 as we
increase C from 1/2 to Cmax. So, we must perform two
optimizations: an optimization over the state ρ of the
submitted system, and an optimization over the convex
decomposition of ρ she should realize prior to announcing
to Bob which state he should test for.
It is not difficult to show that the optimal ρ has a Bloch
vector that bisects the Bloch vectors representing |ψ0〉
and |ψ1〉, and that the optimal convex decomposition to
realize when |ψ1〉 is the target state is simply the mirror
image in the Bloch sphere of the optimal convex decom-
position when |ψ0〉 is the target state, so that q = p.
These simplifications leave us with a two parameter op-
timization problem: the one parameter corresponding to
the length r of the Bloch vector representing ρ, the other
parameter corresponding to the angle between the Bloch
vectors representing |ψ0〉 and |φ〉. Although, we have not
saying that the state is steered, since what one can steer between
are different convex decompositions of the state.
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FIG. 2: The control disturbance tradeoff for two pure states,
with |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|
2 = 1/2. Curve (a) is for the case where Alice
does not have the option to decline from being tested, consid-
ered in section IIIB, whereas curve (b) is for the case where
she does, considered in section VB. For the former, the dis-
turbance is non-zero for every control above 1/2, while for
the latter it is only non-zero after the point indicated in the
diagram.
been able to perform this optimization analytically for
very value of |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|. The curve (a) in Fig. 2 depicts
the optimal tradeoff for |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 = 1/2.
IV. MOTIVATION AND DEFINITION OF
DISTURBANCE-FREE STATE TARGETING
In the context of the WCF protocol presented earlier,
it may sometimes be the case that the consequences for
Alice if she is caught cheating are sufficiently dire that
she wishes to avoid this outcome at all costs. The ques-
tion then becomes whether this is enough to guarantee
that she follow the honest protocol. For the case of two
non-orthogonal target states, if Alice submits some state
distinct from one of these possibilities, then regardless
of what she announces, she has a non-zero probability
of failing Bob’s test. The only way to be certain to
pass Bob’s test is to submit one of these states and to
announce the same state, that is, to follow the honest
protocol and achieve the trivial control of 1/2. This is
reflected in curve (a) of Fig. (2) by the fact that for ev-
ery value of control greater than 1/2 the disturbance is
non-zero.
Nonetheless, there are useful versions of the task of
state targeting wherein Alice has the option of declining
from announcing a state to Bob, and in such cases, Al-
ice can achieve greater than the trivial control without
incurring any disturbance.
We again introduce a simple WCF protocol as moti-
vation. This differs from the previous one in that both
Alice and Bob are tested for cheating, which results
in a protocol that offers fewer cheating possibilities for
Bob, but more for Alice. If both parties are honest, the
protocol proceeds as follows.
Weak coin flipping protocol 2
1. Alice chooses a bit b uniformly from {0,1}, prepares
|ψb〉 and sends the system to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a bit b′ uniformly from 0,1 and an-
nounces it to Alice (one can think of this as Bob’s
guess of which state Alice submitted).
3. Alice announces b to Bob
If b′ = b, then
4. Bob returns the system to Alice, and Alice tests
the system for being in the state |ψb〉.
Else, if b′ 6= b, then
4. Bob tests the system for being in the state |ψb〉.
If at step (4) the system fails Alice’s(Bob’s) test,
then Bob(Alice) is caught cheating. Otherwise, if
b′ = b then Bob wins, while if b′ 6= b, then Alice
wins.
As before, Alice may cheat by preparing the system in
an arbitrary state of her choosing, and making whatever
announcement she pleases. The difference is that if she
announces b′ = b, then she is not tested by Bob.
This suggests a more general type of state targeting
task, which differs from the one outlined in section II
insofar as step (iii) is replaced by:
(iii′) Alice has the option of either (a) announcing a state
to Bob (not necessarily the target state), or (b)
declining to announce a state to Bob.
There is also an additional possible outcome relative to
the version from the last section, namely:
(E) Alice declines to announce a state to Bob.
Because of this additional outcome, Alice can make
her disturbance strictly zero while still achieving a non-
trivial control. We call this disturbance-free state tar-
geting. The control that Alice achieves by implementing
her best disturbance-free state targeting is still defined
as her probability of achieving outcome (A). We call this
her disturbance-free control, and denote it by Cdf. (An
analogous quantity is defined in Ref. [7], where it is called
Alice’s threshold for cheat-sensitivity.)
The possibility of disturbance-free state targeting is
analogous to something that occurs in unambiguous dis-
crimination of pure states[15]. (The latter is a procedure
which either discriminates the states without any prob-
ability of error, or else simply returns the result “incon-
clusive”.) If the inconclusive outcome is not obtained,
then the pure state with which the system was prepared
6is known with certainty, and can be re-prepared, so that
a test for the initial state can be passed with certainty.
If the inconclusive result is obtained, then the estima-
tor declines from having the system tested. Thus, the
existence of an inconclusive outcome allows for the pos-
sibility of information gain without disturbance. Analo-
gously, the option to decline from being tested allows for
non-trivial control without disturbance.
V. DISTURBANCE-FREE STATE TARGETING
FOR TWO PURE STATES
A. Maximum disturbance-free control
We now demonstrate how disturbance-free state tar-
geting is achieved in the case where the target state is
chosen uniformly from two non-orthogonal pure states.
The technique is similar to the one used to minimize the
disturbance for a given control. Alice initially couples
the submitted system to an ancilla (which she keeps) so
that the state of the pair is entangled. After learning the
identity of the target state, she measures her ancilla in
such a way that the state of the submitted system is up-
dated according to a convex decomposition that contains
the target state. If it happens to collapse to the target
state, then she announces the target state, and is certain
to pass Bob’s test. If it collapses to another state, then
she simply declines to announce a state to Bob.
The fact that such a scheme can achieve a control
greater than 1/2 can be seen by considering Fig. (3). If
the state ρ that Alice submits falls between ρH and the
completely mixed state (the centre of the Bloch sphere),
and she steers to a two-element convex decomposition
containing the target state, then because ρ is necessar-
ily geometrically closer to the target state than to the
other element of the decomposition, and because greater
geometric proximity represents a greater probability of
collapsing to that element [5], it follows that the proba-
bility of announcing the target state is necessarily greater
than 1/2.
We now proceed to find the maximum probability of
disturbance-free state targeting. We must vary over both
the convex decompositions for a fixed submitted state,
and over the submitted states.
In the first optimization, we seek to find the largest
probability with which the target state appears in a con-
vex decomposition of the submitted state. A corollary
we prove in section (VIII) establishes that the maximum
probability of collapsing the state ρ to the state |ψ〉 is
1
〈ψ| ρ−1 |ψ〉 . (7)
Given that the target state is equally likely to be |ψ0〉 or
|ψ1〉, the disturbance-free control for a submitted state ρ
is
Cdf =
1
2
1
〈ψ0| ρ−1 |ψ0〉 +
1
2
1
〈ψ1| ρ−1 |ψ1〉 (8)
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FIG. 3: A section of the Bloch sphere showing the state ρopt
that yields the largest disturbance-free control when the pos-
sible target states are |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉.
We can now consider the optimization over ρ. Since
there is clearly no advantage to preparing a ρ outside
of the subspace spanned by |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 , the problem
can be entirely formulated in a two-dimensional Hilbert
space, so that we may use the Bloch sphere representa-
tion of states. The optimization is done in Appendix A.
The maximum disturbance-free control is found to be
Cmaxdf ≡ max
ρ
Cdf =
1
1 +
√
1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2
. (9)
The strategy that achieves this control requires Alice
to prepare a mixed state of the form
ρopt =
α
2
I +
1− α
2
(|ψ0〉 〈ψ0|+ |ψ1〉 〈ψ1|) , (10)
where
α = 1− 1
2
1
|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|3
(
1−
√
1− |〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2
)
. (11)
It is easy to see that the maximum disturbance-free
control, Eq. (9), is less than the maximum control,
Eq. (2), for any pair of states. Thus, to avoid creating a
disturbance, Alice must pay a price in control.
In terms of the Bloch sphere picture, ρopt has a par-
ticularly simple geometric relation to |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉, as is
depicted in Fig. 3. Note that the states |X0〉 and |X1〉
are orthogonal and symmetric about |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉. If
the target state is |ψ0〉, then Alice steers to the decom-
position of ρopt containing |ψ0〉 and |X0〉.
B. The control-disturbance trade-off for state
targeting with an option to decline
It is interesting to determine the minimal disturbance
for a given control when there is an option to decline from
announcing a state. In this case, the disturbance will be
7non-zero only for controls greater than the disturbance-
free control. However, the disturbance for the maximal
control is the same, since to achieve her maximal con-
trol, Alice must always announce the target state, and
consequently never exercises her option to decline from
announcing a state.
We consider this tradeoff in the simple case of two pure
states. Suppose that Alice has submitted some ρ and
now learns that the target state is |ψ0〉. As described in
section III B, she can make a measurement on the ancilla
which collapses the submitted system to either the state
|φ〉 (with probability q) or to state |φ′〉 (with probability
1−q). As before, if she collapses to the state |φ〉 then she
announces the state |ψ0〉. Unlike before however, if she
collapses ρ to |φ′〉 then she declines to announce a state
to Bob rather than announcing |ψ1〉. A similar strategy is
adopted if the target state is |ψ1〉. This scenario does not
affect the expression for the control that Alice achieves,
it is still given by (5). However her disturbance is now
given by
D =
1
2
q(1− |〈φ|ψ0〉|2) + 1
2
p(1− |〈χ|ψ1〉|2) (12)
Once again the problem of minimizing Alice’s distur-
bance for a given control can be simplified to an opti-
mization over only two parameters. The solutions to this
optimization problem can be found analytically. Specif-
ically, we obtain the optimal control and disturbance as
parametric equations in a parameter µ which runs from
0 to θ, where θ = |〈ψ0|ψ1〉| by definition. Explicitly:
Copt =
1
2
cosµ− sin(θ − µ)
1 + sin(θ − µ) (13)
Dopt =
1
2
1− cosµ
1 + sin(θ − µ) (14)
The length r of the Bloch vector corresponding to the
optimal ρ that Alice should submit for a given control is
ropt =
1− sin(θ − µ)
cos(θ − µ) (15)
Curve (b) of Fig. (2) is a plot of this optimal tradeoff for
θ = π/4.
VI. TESTING FOR A MIXED STATE
We have thus far examined state targeting under the
assumption that the possible target states are pure. A
useful and powerful generalization of state targeting oc-
curs if we admit the possibility of mixed target states.
Recall that the task of state targeting requires Bob to test
the submitted system for being in the state announced
by Alice. Thus, we must begin by discussing the possible
ways in which one can test for a mixed state. Because
greater difficulty in passing a test typically yields greater
security for the protocol making use of it, we seek to find
the tests that are most difficult to pass.
For convenience, we call the tester Bob and the one
being tested Alice. The only kind of measurement on
the submitted system alone that is always passed when
the system is in the state σ is one that is associated with
a projector onto a subspace that is greater than or equal
to the support of σ. The most difficult such measurement
to pass is the one associated with the projector onto the
support of σ. We call this the support test for σ. Unfor-
tunately, there are many other mixed states which always
yield a positive outcome for this test, namely those hav-
ing the same support as σ. Thus, this test is relatively
easy to pass.
Another interesting test is one that makes use of a par-
ticular convex decomposition of σ, that is, a set {pk, |ψk〉}
such that
∑
k pk|ψk〉〈ψk| = σ. The idea is that if Alice
prepared the system in a state by drawing it from the set
{|ψk〉} according to the distribution pk, then from Bob’s
perspective, she has submitted the state σ. If Alice does
not implement such a preparation, then it is possible for
Bob to sometimes detect this fact; he simply demands
that Alice announce the value of k to him, and he then
tests the system for being in the state |ψk〉. We call this
a convex decomposition test for σ. This test is better
than the support test, because if Alice initially prepares
a mixed state that merely has the same support as σ,
this does not guarantee that she can pass a convex de-
composition test with certainty. Nonetheless, it is still
a weak test since there any mixed states besides σ that
can pass the test with certainly, namely, any state that
is a convex sum of the |ψk〉. The problem is that the test
cannot verify anything about the probability distribution
from which the state was drawn. Convex decomposition
tests arise often in the design of cryptographic protocols
[1, 5, 6, 8], although they are not typically identified as
tests for a particular mixed state.
The best way of testing whether a system is described
by a state σ is to test whether a larger system, of which
the first is a subsystem, is in a purification of σ. Suppose
Alice initially submits a systemB to Bob. When it comes
time to test this system for being in σ, Alice is required
to submit a second system, called the message systemM ,
and Bob measures the pair MB for being in a particular
purification of σ, that is, for being in a state |Ψ〉 such
that TrM (|Ψ〉〈Ψ|) = σ (there are many purifications of a
mixed state, but all these yield equivalent tests). This is
better than either the support or convex decomposition
tests. First of all, unlike the latter tests, Alice can only
pass this test with certainty if the state of the submitted
system was σ. More importantly, it can be shown that for
every convex decomposition test, there is a purification
test that is equally or more difficult to pass. This is
proven in appendix B.
Notwithstanding this fact, in the context of state tar-
geting between a pair of mixed states, it is often pos-
sible to find a pair of convex decomposition tests that
yield a maximum control as low as the maximum con-
8trol for a pair of purification tests. An example is offered
by the coin flipping protocols proposed in Ref. [6] and
in Ref. [4], where Alice’s optimal cheating strategies are
state targeting procedures that achieve the same control.
Because of the practical difficulty of generating, preserv-
ing and measuring entangled states, it is likely that, other
things being equal, a pair of convex decomposition tests
is preferable to a pair of purification tests for use in a
cryptographic protocol. However, it is an open question
whether for every pair of purification tests there is a pair
of convex decomposition tests that yield the same max-
imum control. In any event, it is clear that convex de-
composition tests cannot do better than purification tests
and therefore for the rest of this paper we focus on the
latter.
VII. STATE TARGETING FOR TWO MIXED
STATES
We begin by motivating the generalization of state tar-
geting to mixed states by describing another improve-
ment on our simple weak coin flipping protocol. The
protocol is defined in terms of a pair of states |Ψ0〉 and
|Ψ1〉 on a bi-partite system, where the parts are denoted
by M and B. If both parties are honest, it proceeds as
follows.
Weak coin flipping protocol 3
1. Alice chooses a bit b uniformly from {0,1}, prepares
the system MB in the state |Ψb〉 and sends B to
Bob.
2. Bob chooses a bit b′ uniformly from {0,1} and an-
nounces it to Alice (one can think of this as Bob’s
guess of b).
3. Alice announces b and sends the system M to Bob.
4. Bob tests the system MB for being in the state
|Ψb〉.
If at step (4) the system MB fails Bob’s test, then
Alice is caught cheating. Otherwise, if b′ = b then
Bob wins, while if b′ 6= b, then Alice wins.
Assuming the states |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are entangled over
HM⊗HB, their reduced density operators on B, denoted
σ0 and σ1, are mixed. |Ψb〉 is a purification of σb. Thus,
Bob’s test at step (4) is a purification test for σb. It
should now be clear that Alice’s task when cheating is an
instance of state targeting with two mixed target states,
since the state σb that Alice would like to pass a test
for is determined by Bob’s announcement, which occurs
after she has submitted system B.
Note that if |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 are taken to be product
states, this protocol reduces to WCF protocol 1. Mak-
ing use of entangled |Ψ0〉 and |Ψ1〉 (equivalently, mixed
σ0 and σ1) provides an improvement over WCF pro-
tocol 1 insofar as it provides better simultaneous secu-
rity against Alice and Bob. This is shown explicitly in
Ref. [4]. Briefly, it follows from the fact that the secu-
rity against Alice is quantified by the fidelity between
σ0 and σ1 (as we shall show), while the security against
Bob is quantified by the trace distance (see Ref. [10, 11]),
and the fact that the greatest fidelity for a given trace
distance is achieved when σ0 and σ1 are mixed [18].
The only aspect of the definition of state targeting (sec-
tion II) that must be changed to accommodate the pos-
sibility of purification tests for mixed states is that at
step (iii), when Alice announces a state to Bob, she must
also supply him with a message system, so that he may
measure whether the submitted and message systems to-
gether are in a purification of the state announced.
In this section we explain the most general strategy
which Alice can employ in order to obtain non-trivial
control in state targeting between two mixed states.
In order to increase her control, it may be to Alice’s
advantage to make random choices. As is well known
however[2], Alice loses nothing by making these choices
at a quantum level - that is, by entangling the sys-
tem MB with an ancillary system A which she retains.
In general therefore, she will be preparing the system
AMB in an entangled state |ΘAMB〉. The reduced den-
sity on the system B which is submitted to Bob is then
ρ = TrAM |ΘAMB〉〈ΘAMB|. Thus, in this case Alice has
submitted ρ to Bob.
Prior to Alice announcing to Bob which state he should
test for, she may implement a transformation on the sys-
tems AM that remain in her possession (this includes
the possibility of a measurement, since Alice loses noth-
ing by keeping the outcome at the quantum level). The
most general transformation is described by a completely
positive trace-preserving linear map. However, by Neu-
mark’s theorem [16], an equivalent transformation can
always be achieved using a unitary map and a larger an-
cilla. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume
that Alice implements a unitary transformation UAMb ,
where the subscript b = 0, 1 indicates that the operation
which Alice performs will generally depend on which of
the states, σ0 or σ1, is the target state.
We denote by P (σb|ρ, UAMb ) the probability that Alice
passes a test for σb, given that she submitted ρ to Bob
and employs the interaction UAMb prior to sending M
to him. Given our description of Alice’s most general
strategy, we have that
P (σb|ρ, UAMb ) = |〈ΘAMB|UAMb ⊗ IB|ΨMBb 〉|2 (16)
Alice’s maximum control is given by
Cmax = max
ρ
1
2
1∑
b=0
max
UAM
b
P (σb|ρ, UAMb ) (17)
Thus, finding the maximum control that Alice can
achieve requires two optimizations: (i) For a fixed sub-
mitted ρ, an optimization over the transformation she
implements on the systems remaining in her possession
after she has learnt the identity of the target state. (ii)
An optimization over the initial entangled state |ΘAMB〉
9that she should prepare, equivalently, over the state ρ
that she should submit to Bob.
A. Optimal state unveiling procedure
In this section we will assume that the state ρ which
Alice has submitted is fixed, as is the target state, σ,
that defines the purification test on MB to which her
system and the message system will be subjected. We
are therefore performing an optimization of the form (i)
above.
When Alice succeeds at passing a test for a state σ,
we say that she has unveiled σ. This terminology is sug-
gested by the application of state targeting to bit com-
mitment. We wish to determine the maximum probabil-
ity with which Alice can pass a test for σ, i.e. unveil σ,
given that she has submitted ρ.
By the definition of a purification test, when Alice
wishes to unveil σ, she must send a message system M
to Bob, who will then test whether the composite MB is
in a particular purification |ΨMB〉 of σ. As it turns out,
the particular purification of σ that is used in the test
does not affect the difficulty of the task.
Suppose for the moment that Alice does not use an
ancilla, and instead simply preparesMB in the pure state
|ΦMB〉 and implements a unitary UM on M alone. In
this case, the optimization problem reduces to finding the
maximum probability with which a purification on MB
of ρ can pass the test for being a purification on MB of
σ, and the solution is given by Uhlmann’s theorem [17],
which may be stated as follows:
max
UM
|〈ΦMB |UM ⊗ IB|ΨMB〉|2 = F (ρ, σ)2, (18)
where F (ρ, σ) ≡ Tr|√ρ√σ| is the fidelity between σ and
ρ.
Of course, there is nothing preventing Alice from mak-
ing use of an ancilla, so one might na¨ively expect her
to be able to do better than this. However, it turns out
that the use of an ancilla does not in fact give Alice more
targeting power. This fact follows from a generalization
of Uhlmann’s theorem; the need for this theorem 4 (and
an initial proof of it) was pointed out to us by Claus
Do¨scher:
Theorem 1:
max
UAM
|〈ΘAMB|UAM ⊗ IB|ΨMB〉|2 = F (ρ, σ)2, (19)
4 In Ref. [4], Alice’s maximum control for state targeting in the
context of a bit commitment protocol was derived without suffi-
cient generality since the possibility of making use of an ancillary
systems A was not considered. The results of that paper remain
unaffected, however, since this possibility does not increase the
control that Alice can achieve.
where UAM is a unitary map on AM , IB is the iden-
tity map on B, ρ = TrAM |ΘAMB〉〈ΘAMB| and σ =
TrM |ΨMB〉〈ΨMB|.
Proof: To see that the left hand side (LHS) of Eq. (19)
must be greater than or equal to F (ρ, σ)2, note that
LHS = max
UAM
∑
k
|〈ΘAMB|UAM ⊗ IB| |χAk 〉 ⊗ |ΨMB〉〉 |2
≥ max
UAM
|〈ΘAMB|UAM ⊗ IB| |χA〉 ⊗ |ΨMB〉〉 |2
= F (ρ, σ)2
In the first step, we have simply introduced an arbitrary
resolution of identity for A in terms of the basis {|χAk 〉}.
The second step follows from the fact that all the terms
in the sum over k are positive (here, |χA〉 is an arbi-
trary element of the basis {|χAk 〉}). Noting that |ΘAMB〉
and |χA〉 ⊗ |ΨMB〉 are purifications of ρ and σ on AMB,
Uhlmann’s theorem, Eq. (18), dictates that the optimiza-
tion yields F (ρ, σ)2.
To see that the LHS of Eq. (19) must be less than
or equal to F (ρ, σ)2, we note that if the reduced den-
sity operator of (UAM†⊗ IB)|ΘAMB〉 overMB is denoted
by WMB, then LHS = maxUAM 〈ΨMB|WMB|ΨMB〉 =
maxUAM F (|ΨMB〉〈ΨMB|,WMB). However for any UAM ,
TrMW
MB = ρ, and since the fidelity is non-decreasing
under the partial trace of its arguments [18], we have
F (|ΨMB〉〈ΨMB|,WMB) ≤ F (TrM |ΨMB〉〈ΨMB|,TrMWMB)
= F (σ, ρ).

Theorem 1 tells us that the maximum probability of
unveiling σ given that ρ was submitted is F (σ, ρ)2. We
see from this that it is appropriate to call F (σ, ρ)2 the
‘transition probability’ between σ and ρ, as Uhlmann has
done.
B. Optimal state to submit
The results of the previous subsection were limited to
the case of a fixed submitted ρ. To determine Alice’s
maximum control we need to optimize over ρ, which is
an optimization of form (ii) above.
Combining Eqs. (17) and (16) with theorem 1, we find
that the maximum control given a target state drawn
uniformly from {σ0, σ1} is given by
Cmax = max
ρ
(
1
2
F (σ0, ρ)
2 +
1
2
F (σ1, ρ)
2
)
.
The result of the optimization over ρ is
Cmax = 12 (1 + F (σ0, σ1)). (20)
The proof of this was first presented in Ref. [4] (lemma
2) and was discovered independently in Ref. [19]. It is
reproduced in Appendix C.
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The optimal strategy, i.e. the one that attains (20),
requires Alice to initially submit a mixed state of the
form
ρopt =
σ0 + σ1 +
√
σ0U
√
σ1 +
√
σ1U
†√σ0
2 (1 + F (σ0, σ1))
, (21)
where
U = |√σ1√σ0|−1√σ0√σ1. (22)
Again, the proof is relegated to Appendix C. It is easy
to verify that these results reduce to those presented in
section III A for pure states.
It is interesting to note that the maximum probability
of correctly estimating which of two mixed states applies
to a system is given by (1+D(σ0, σ1))/2, whereD denotes
the trace distance. We have just shown that the maxi-
mum control in state targeting between two mixed states
is given by (1 + F (σ0, σ1))/2. Although the trace dis-
tance and fidelity are known to be closely related math-
ematical measures of distinguishability for mixed states,
the former is generally presumed to be much better op-
erationally motivated because of its connection to state
estimation. Our result on maximum control can be in-
terpreted as providing a simple operational definition of
the fidelity.
VIII. DISTURBANCE-FREE STATE
TARGETING FOR TWO MIXED STATES
Consider a fourth and final weak coin flipping protocol,
which is to WCF protocol 3 as WCF protocol 2 is to WCF
protocol 1.
Weak coin flipping protocol 4
1. Alice chooses a bit b uniformly from {0,1}, prepares
the system MB in the state |Ψb〉 and sends B to
Bob.
2. Bob chooses a bit b′ uniformly from {0,1} and an-
nounces it to Alice (one can think of this as Bob’s
guess of b).
3. Alice announces b and sends the system M to Bob.
If b′ = b, then
4. Bob returns the system B to Alice, and Alice tests
the system MB for being in the state |Ψb〉.
Else if b′ 6= b, then
4. Bob tests the system MB for being in the state
|Ψb〉.
If at step (4) the system fails Alice’s(Bob’s) test,
then Bob(Alice) is caught cheating. Otherwise, if
b′ = b then Bob wins, while if b′ 6= b, then Alice
wins.
The difference from WCF protocol 3 is that when Bob
guesses b correctly, he must return system B to Alice. If
Bob has gained information about the state of the sys-
tem, then he has necessarily caused a disturbance to the
state, and Alice has a probability of detecting this. Thus,
the protocol offers greater security against Bob at the
expense of security against Alice (since she is tested less
frequently).
Alice’s cheating strategy in this case involves state tar-
geting between mixed states, as in WCF protocol 3, how-
ever unlike that protocol, if she announces a b that is
equal to b′, she is not tested by Bob. Thus, this is an
instance of state targeting between mixed states wherein
there is an option to decline being tested. The state
targeting task is the same as the one described in sec-
tion IV except that at step (iii’), if Alice announces a
state to Bob, then she must also supply him with a mes-
sage system, so that he may implement a purification
test. The possibility of declining from being tested im-
plies that Alice can achieve a non-trivial control while
not running any risk of failing Bob’s test. In other words,
her disturbance-free control can be greater than the triv-
ial control. In this section, we investigate the maximum
disturbance-free control that can be achieved in state tar-
geting between two mixed states.
Alice’s most general strategy for this sort of state tar-
geting involves introducing an ancilla A, so that AMB is
in an entangled state |ΘAMB〉 with reduced density op-
erator ρ on B. At the time of announcement, Alice must
perform a measurement on the system AM which either
collapses the B system to the target state σb (and the
MB system to a purification of σb) in which case she can
pass the test for σb with certainty, or she collapses the
B system to another state, in which case she invokes her
option to not be tested by Bob.
When Alice happens to collapse the state of Bob’s sys-
tem to σ, we say that she has generated the state σ. The
distinction between state unveiling and state generation
is critical to understanding the difference between achiev-
ing state targeting and achieving disturbance-free state
targeting. A state has been unveiled whenever a test for
the state has been passed. A state has been generated
only if a test for the state would always be passed.
We begin by looking at Alice’s ability to generate σ
given a fixed submitted ρ. We then consider variations
over ρ.
A. Optimal state generation procedure
We assume that Alice has submitted a fixed state ρ and
is trying to generate the state σ. As discussed in section
IV, it was proven in Ref. [14] that by appropriate mea-
surements on AM , Alice can update her description of
B according to any extremal convex decomposition of ρ,
that is, any convex decomposition whose elements are all
pure states. This also holds true for non-extremal convex
decompositions (whose elements may be mixed states) as
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is shown in Ref. [5]. Thus, Alice’s maximum probabil-
ity of generating σ is given by the maximum probability
with which the state σ can appear in a convex decom-
position of ρ. The latter is fixed by the following result,
communicated to us by Michael Nielsen:
Theorem 2: The maximum probability with which a
state σ can appear in a convex decomposition of a state
ρ is
1
λmax(ρ−1σ)
(23)
if the support of σ belongs to the support of ρ, and zero
otherwise.
Proof: It is well known that if the support of σ is not
contained in the support of ρ then σ does not appear in
any convex decomposition of ρ [14]. If the support of σ
is so contained, then there exist decompositions of the
form
ρ = pσ + (1 − p)x (24)
where x is a density operator and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. We seek
to determine the largest possible value of p; the key con-
straint is that x be a valid density operator. Since it
follows directly from Eq. (24) that x has trace 1, the
constraint becomes simply that x be positive. Acting on
the left and the right of Eq. (24) with
√
ρ−1 (where the
inverse is taken over the support of ρ), we have
I = p
√
ρ
−1
σ
√
ρ
−1
+ (1− p)√ρ−1x√ρ−1. (25)
The constraint that x be positive implies that (1 −
p)
√
ρ−1x
√
ρ−1 is positive, which in turn implies
p
√
ρ−1σ
√
ρ−1 ≤ I. This constrains all the eigenvalues
of p
√
ρ−1σ
√
ρ−1 to be less than 1, which implies that
p ≤ 1/λ(√ρ−1σ√ρ−1) where λ(X) denotes an eigen-
value of X. The maximum achievable value of p is simply
the smallest upper bound, which is the reciprocal of the
largest eigenvalue 1/λmax(
√
ρ−1σ
√
ρ−1). Making use of
the fact that λmax(AB) = λmax(BA), we obtain the de-
sired result. 
Corollary The maximum probability with which a
pure state |ψ〉 〈ψ| can appear in a convex decomposition
of a state ρ is
1
〈ψ| ρ−1 |ψ〉 . (26)
This follows from the fact that
λmax(ρ−1 |ψ〉 〈ψ|) = λmax(√ρ−1 |ψ〉 〈ψ| √ρ−1)
= 〈ψ| ρ−1 |ψ〉 ,
where the last equality is implied by the fact that√
ρ−1 |ψ〉 is an eigenvector of √ρ−1 |ψ〉 〈ψ| √ρ−1
with eigenvalue 〈ψ| ρ−1 |ψ〉, and the fact that√
ρ−1 |ψ〉 〈ψ| √ρ−1, being of rank 1, has only a sin-
gle non-zero eigenvalue.
Besides its obvious importance for state targeting,
Theorem 2 is also an important result for the theory
of entanglement transformation. It specifies the largest
probability of transforming a purification of ρ into a pu-
rification of σ given access to only the purifying share of
the bi-partite system.
B. Optimal state to submit
To compute the maximum disturbance-free control in
state targeting between σ0 and σ1, it follows from Theo-
rem 2 that we need to evaluate
Cmaxdf =
1
2
max
ρ
(
1
λmax(ρ−1σ0)
+
1
λmax(ρ−1σ1)
)
. (27)
We have only been able to obtain bounds on this quantity,
the most simple ones being:
1
1 +
√
1− F (σ0, σ1)2
≤ Cmaxdf ≤ 1−
1
2
D(σ0, σ1), (28)
where, as before, F (x, y) = Tr|√x√y| is the fidelity, and
D(x, y) = 12Tr|x− y| is the trace distance. We point out
that Cmaxdf forms an operationally motivated measure of
the distance between two mixed states.
The lower bound is derived as follows. To generate σ0
or σ1 on demand, it is sufficient to generate purifications
|Ψ0〉 , |Ψ1〉 of σ0 and σ1 on demand. We know that the
latter can be done with the probability given by Eq. (9),
and the largest this probability can be made is for maxi-
mally parallel purifications, which by Uhlmann’s theorem
satisfy |〈Ψ0|Ψ1〉|2 = F (σ0, σ1)2.Making this substitution
yields the advertised lower bound of Eq. (28).
Note that the lower bound is saturated for pure σ0
and σ1. A number of stronger results can be obtained
if σ0 and σ1 are confined to a two-dimensional Hilbert
space. For instance, in the special case of σ0 and σ1
having equal purity, we find the lower bound of Eq. (28)
is again saturated, and for σ0 and σ1 commuting, one
can find a simple analytic expression for the maximum
disturbance-free control.
The upper bound is more subtle. Recall that our task
is to find a state ρ and two convex decompositions of ρ,
one involving σ0 and the other involving σ1,
ρ = p0σ0 + (1− p0)x0
= p1σ1 + (1− p1)x1,
such that 12 (p0 + p1) is maximized. We first note that
pb = 1− D(ρ, σb)
D(σb, xb)
. (29)
This follows from the observation that
D(ρ, σb) =
1
2
Tr |(pb − 1)σb + (1 − pb)xb|
= (1− pb)D(σb, xb)
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Now, making use of the fact that D(σb, xb) ≤ 1, we find
1
2
(p0 + p1) ≤ 1− 1
2
(D(ρ, σ0) +D(ρ, σ1)) . (30)
Finally, recognizing that the trace distance is a metric
and thus satisfies D(a, b) +D(b, c) ≥ D(a, c), we obtain
our upper bound. This upper bound is sometimes satu-
rated, for instance, when the two states are confined to
a 2-d Hilbert space with one being pure and the other
being the completely mixed state.
IX. STATE SPYING
To motivate our study of state targeting, we have in-
troduced a variety of weak coin flipping protocols wherein
Alice’s cheating strategies are instances of state target-
ing. Since it has not been our intention to provide a
security analysis of any particular protocol, we have said
little about Bob’s optimal cheating strategies. Nonethe-
less, in the protocols where there is quantum communi-
cation from Bob to Alice (i.e. protocols 2 and 4), Bob’s
cheating strategies are instances of a task that is comple-
mentary in many respects to the task of state targeting.
We shall call this task state spying.
We begin by contrasting state spying to state discrim-
ination. The latter is what occurs in the WCF protocols
where Bob is not tested. Here, a cheating Bob is faced
with the following situation. Alice has submitted a sys-
tem prepared in one of a pair of states, and Bob seeks
to guess which state this was. Thus, he seeks to maxi-
mize his information gain, specifically, his probability of
correctly estimating the state that Alice submitted. On
the other hand, in the protocols where Bob is required to
return a quantum system to Alice whenever he guesses
correctly, he is faced with a different task: to gain infor-
mation while avoiding, as best as possible, having Alice
detect this fact. Specifically, Bob seeks to maximize his
probability of correctly estimating the state and passing
Alice’s test. We call this task state spying because the
job of a spy is not simply to gain information, but to do
so without the adversary being aware of this fact.
The simplest version of the state spying task proceeds
as follows:
(i) Alice submits a system in some state, called the
prepared state, to Bob.
(ii) Bob implements a measurement on the sys-
tem(possibly trivial) and forms an estimate of the
prepared state, called the guessed state.
(iii) Bob announces the guessed state.
(iv) Bob returns the system to Alice, and Alice performs
a Pass/Fail test for the prepared state.
The possible outcomes are:
(A) Bob announces the prepared state and passes Al-
ice’s test
(B) Bob announces the prepared state and fails Alice’s
test
(C) Bob announces a non-prepared state and passes Al-
ice’s test
(D) Bob announces a non-prepared state and fails Al-
ice’s test
In state spying, “success” is to achieve outcome (A). Pur-
suing the spying metaphor, we call the probability of
achieving outcome (A) the intelligence. Another proba-
bility that is of interest is the probability of failing Alice’s
test, i.e. the sum of the probabilities of outcomes (B) or
(D). We call this the disturbance.
In the introduction, we provided a brief description
of how state spying is similar to state targeting. The
analogy is clearer if one compares the above definition
of state spying with the definition of state targeting pro-
vided in section II. Moreover, just as it is useful for
security analyses of two-party protocols to determine the
maximal control, the maximum disturbance-free control
and the optimal control-disturbance trade-off, so too is
it useful to determine the maximum intelligence, the
maximum disturbance-free intelligence, and the optimal
intelligence-disturbance trade-off.
For pure states, the maximum probability of success
in disturbance-free state spying is equal to the maximum
probability of success in error-free state discrimination,
since someone who has achieved success in an error-free
discrimination procedure knows the identity of the pre-
pared state, and consequently can always re-prepare the
state and pass a test for it with certainty.
Mixed states can be incorporated into the notion of
state spying in exactly the same manner in which they
are incorporated into state targeting. As we have shown,
a test for a purification of a mixed state is the most diffi-
cult test to pass, and consequently is the most interesting
test to consider. In this case, the system that Alice sub-
mits to Bob will be entangled with one that remains in
her possession. Because of this entanglement, successful
error-free state discrimination does not imply success-
ful disturbance-free state spying. Although it is possible
to achieve error-free discrimination of mixed states with
some probability [20], having classical knowledge of which
mixed state was prepared is insufficient to re-prepare a
purification of that state.
There are clearly many interesting questions that re-
main to be answered about the task of state spying.
X. APPLICATIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
It is obvious that the security analyses of the WCF
protocols we have presented throughout the paper require
determining the optimal degree of success that can be
achieved in a variety of state targeting tasks. This is also
true for the security analysis of protocols for other two-
party cryptographic tasks such as strong coin flipping
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[4, 6, 7, 19], partially binding and partially concealing
bit commitment [2, 3, 4], and bit escrow [8].
Quantum two-party protocols are especially signifi-
cant because in classical information theory there are
no two-party protocols which offer information-theoretic
security, that is, security which relies on the laws of
physics rather than on computational intractability as-
sumptions. In the quantum context, there exist two-
party protocols that can guarantee to each party that
if they follow the honest protocol, their opponent can-
not bias the outcome against them more than a certain
amount [4, 6, 7, 8]. Moreover, there exist quantum pro-
tocols that can guarantee to each party that if their op-
ponent cheats, then there will be a non-zero probability
of detecting this fact[7, 21]. We call these two types of
security bias-resistance and cheat-sensitivity respectively.
Our results have bearing on both. Specifically, the maxi-
mum control specifies the degree of bias-resistance, while
the maximum disturbance-free control, and the optimal
control-disturbance trade-off specify the degree of cheat-
sensitivity that is offered by a protocol.
The problem we have considered here can be general-
ized in many ways. First, one could consider the case
where the prior probabilities of different states being the
target state are unequal. Most of our results are eas-
ily generalized to this case. Second, one could consider
different sorts of tests, in particular, tests that are not
associated one-to-one with states, in the sense that such
a test could be passed with certainty by more than one
state. For instance, one could consider support tests and
convex decomposition tests for mixed states (defined in
section VI). Some results on the degree of control that
can be achieved in state targeting for convex decompo-
sition tests can be found in Refs. [5, 6? ]. Finally, one
could imagine that the target state (or target test) could
be chosen from a set of states (tests) with more than two
elements. Answering such questions will shed light on
whether various existing protocols for two-party crypto-
graphic tasks can be improved by modifying the sort of
state targeting that is faced by a cheater.
XI. DISCUSSION
We have presented an introduction to a quantum infor-
mation theoretic primitive we term state targeting. We
have argued that this is a primitive task in quantum in-
formation, in the same sense that state estimation is a
primitive task. Indeed, we have shown that state target-
ing has a natural dual in the context of state estimation,
namely, the task of state spying, which occurs when the
estimator is interested in gaining information about a
system while minimizing the disturbance that this en-
tails. We have solved a variety of optimization problems
associated with state targeting. In the process, we have
derived a generalization of Uhlmann’s theorem and have
shown how the fidelity can arise in a natural operational
context. We end by identifying which aspects of state
)(0 xp )(1 xp
x
1I0
I
FIG. 4: A pair of non-orthogonal classical probability distri-
butions.
targeting can be deemed truly quantum.
If one adopts the view that quantum states are states
of knowledge, rather than physical states [22], what is
analogous to a quantum state in classical mechanics
is a probability distribution, and what is analogous to
non-orthogonality of quantum states is non-disjointness
of probability distributions, where two distributions are
non-disjoint if there exists a non-empty subset of the
physical state space to which they both assign non-zero
probability. A pair of non-disjoint distributions are de-
picted in Fig. 4.
By the lights of this analogy, the task of state esti-
mation has a natural classical analogue. Specifically, the
task of correctly identifying which of a non-orthogonal
pair of quantum states describes a system is analogous
to the task of correctly identifying which of a non-disjoint
pair of probability distributions describes a classical sys-
tem, that is, of identifying whether the system was pre-
pared by drawing its physical state at random from one
or another of a pair of non-disjoint probability distribu-
tions. Just as the quantum discrimination task cannot
be accomplished with certainty, neither can this classical
discrimination task. The reason is that the physical state
of the system has some probability of lying in the over-
lap of the two probability distributions (the region I0∩I1
in Fig. 4), and this is consistent with both preparations.
Thus, even a measurement that completely determined
the physical state of the system could not reveal which
preparation was implemented. Nonetheless, just as in
quantum mechanics, there is a probability greater than
1/2 of a correct estimation, and a non-zero probability
of error-free discrimination. Specifically, if one measures
the physical state of the system, and finds it in the re-
gion outside the overlap of the distributions (outside of
I0∩I1), then one knows with certainty which distribution
describes the system.
Similarly, there is a classical analogue for the task of
state targeting. The target quantum state is replaced by
a target probability distribution. Alice submits a system
to Bob, then learns the identity of the target distribu-
tion, announces a distribution to Bob, and Bob tests the
submitted system for being described by the announced
distribution. The simplest way for Bob to test for a dis-
tribution is to test the system for being in the support
of the distribution, that is, for being in the subset of the
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physical state space that is assigned non-zero probability
by the distribution. For instance, one tests for pb(x) by
verifying whether x lies in region Ib, depicted in Fig. 4.
It is now clear that Alice can achieve some non-trivial
control. For instance, if she initially submits a system
prepared according to p0(x), but the target distribution
is p1(x), then she still has some probability of passing a
test for p1(x). Specifically, her probability is the integral
of p0(x) in the region I0 ∩ I1.
For both state estimation and state targeting, there are
differences between what can be achieved in the quantum
and the classical contexts.
In the case of estimation of classical probability dis-
tributions, one does not necessarily alter the probability
distribution by acquiring information about it, and thus
one does not alter the probability of passing subsequent
tests. For instance, if the distribution is pb(x), then the
fact that someone measures whether x is in the interval
I0 or not does not change the fact that the system will
be found in the interval Ib when tested. On the other
hand, gaining information about which of a pair of non-
orthogonal states describes a quantum system does in-
fluence the probability that this system will subsequently
pass a test for the state in which it was initially prepared.
In the case of classical distribution targeting, there is
a strategy that allows one to pass the test for the target
state with certainty. For instance, if the target distri-
bution is one of p0(x) or p1(x), then Alice can simply
prepare the system in a physical state x ∈ I0 ∩ I1 and
be certain to pass both the test for p0(x) (being in the
interval I0) and the test for p1(x) (being in the interval
I1). One can say that Alice achieves complete control
in this case. On the other hand, in the quantum case,
such complete control is not possible because no quan-
tum state can pass the test for each of two non-orthogonal
pure states with certainty.
Thus, if one takes the view that quantum states are
states of knowledge, what is surprising about quantum
state estimation is not that one cannot achieve an error-
free discrimination of non-orthogonal states with cer-
tainty but rather that one cannot gain information with-
out incurring a disturbance. Similarly, what is surprising
about quantum state targeting is not the possibility of
achieving a non-trivial control, but rather the impossibil-
ity of achieving complete control, that is, the impossibil-
ity of achieving successful state targeting with probabil-
ity 1, since this is what one would expect from examining
the analogous classical task.
Recognizing this difference between the classical and
quantum tasks is likely to be useful in devising quan-
tum information processing protocols that are provably
superior to their classical counterparts.
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EQS. (9) AND
(10)
If the states ρ, |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are represented by Bloch
vectors ~r, aˆ0, and aˆ1 respectively, then 1/ 〈ψb| ρ−1 |ψb〉
= (1 − |~r|2)/2(1− ~r · aˆb), and Eq. (8) becomes
Cdf =
1
4
(1− |~r|2)
(
1
1− ~r · aˆ0 +
1
1− ~r · aˆ1
)
. (A1)
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Extremizing Cdf with respect to variations in ~r, we obtain
(1 − ~r · aˆ0)2
(
(1− ~r · aˆ0)2~r + (1− |~r|2 aˆ0
)
+(1− ~r · aˆ1)2
(
(1− ~r · aˆ1)2~r + (1 − |~r|2 aˆ1
)
= 0
One can then easily verify that the solution, ~ropt, lies on
the bisector of aˆ0 and aˆ1, that is, ~r
opt · (aˆ0× aˆ1) = 0 and
~ropt · aˆ0 = ~ropt · aˆ1, or equivalently,
~ropt =
∣∣~ropt∣∣ aˆ0 + aˆ1|aˆ0 + aˆ1| (A2)
and has length
∣∣~ropt∣∣ =√ 2
1 + aˆ0 · aˆ1
(
1−
√
1− aˆ0 · aˆ1
2
)
. (A3)
Translating these expressions from the Bloch sphere rep-
resentation to the Hilbert space representation yields
Eq. (10). Finally, plugging ~ropt into Eq. (A1) we obtain
Eq. (9).
APPENDIX B: COMPARISON BETWEEN
CONVEX DECOMPOSITION TESTS AND
PURIFICATION TESTS
The purification test for the mixed state σb is a PVM
measurement {Eb, I − Eb} where
Eb = |ψb〉 〈ψb| (B1)
with |ψb〉 a purification of σb. Alice’s maximum control in
state targeting for two mixed states, σ0 and σ1, assuming
purification tests is
Cpur = max|ψ〉,U0,U1
1∑
b=0
1
2Tr
(
Eb(I ⊗ Ub) |ψ〉 〈ψ| (I ⊗ U †b )
)
= max
|ψ〉,U0,U1
1∑
b=0
1
2 |〈ψb| (I ⊗ Ub) |ψ〉|2
= max
ρ
(
1
2
F (σ0, ρ)
2 +
1
2
F (σ1, ρ)
2
)
.
where we have used Uhlmann’s theorem, Eq. (18). Note
that the choice of purifications is unimportant since the
probability of passing the test does not depend on this
choice; the optimization yields an expression depending
only on the reduced density operators.
Suppose σb has a convex decomposition {(pb,k, |φb,k〉)}.
Typically, in a convex decomposition test Alice sends Bob
a classical message containing b and k, and then Bob mea-
sures the projector onto |φb,k〉 . However, one can think of
Alice’s classical message as being conveyed by an orthog-
onal set of states {|b, k〉} of a quantum “message” system,
and the measurement on the system may be made condi-
tional upon the state of this message system. Thus, one
can understand the convex decomposition test for σb as
a PVM mesurement {Gb, I −Gb} where
Gb =
∑
k
|b, k〉 〈b, k| ⊗ |φb,k〉 〈φb,k| . (B2)
Alice’s maximum control for such a test is
Ccon = max|ψ〉,U0,U1
1∑
b=0
1
2Tr
(
Gb(I ⊗ Ub) |ψ〉 〈ψ| (I ⊗ U †b )
)
(B3)
Now, note that the state
|χb〉 =
∑
k
√
pb,k |b, k〉 |φb,k〉 , (B4)
which is a purification of σb, is an eigenstate of Gb. Thus,
Gb = |χb〉 〈χb|+ Γ, (B5)
for some positive operator Γ.
It follows that for positive A, Tr(GbA) ≥
Tr(|χb〉 〈χb|A). Using this, we obtain
Ccon ≥ max|ψ〉,U0,U1
1∑
b=0
1
2 〈χb| (I ⊗ Ub) |ψ〉 (B6)
But because the probability of passing a purification test
is independent of the choice of purifications, the right
hand side is simply Cpur, and we have
Ccon ≥ Cpur. (B7)
Thus, state targeting with convex decomposition tests
is always as easy, or easier, than state targeting with
purification tests.
APPENDIX C: DERIVATION OF EQS. (20) AND
(21)
We begin by deriving Eq. (20), i.e. that the fidelity
satisfies
max
ρ
(
F 2 (ρ, σ) + F 2 (ρ, ω)
)
= 1 + F (σ, ω) . (C1)
By Uhlmann’s theorem we can re-express the left-hand
side of Eq. (C1) in terms of arbitrary purifications
|ψ〉 , |χ〉 and |φ〉 of ρ, σ and ω,
LHS = max
|ψ〉
(
max
U
|〈χ|U ⊗ I |ψ〉|2 +max
V
|〈φ| V ⊗ I |ψ〉|2
)
.
(C2)
We now invert the order of the maximizations to obtain
LHS = max
U,V
max
|ψ〉
(
|〈χ′|ψ〉|2 + |〈φ′|ψ〉|2
)
, (C3)
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where
|χ′〉 = U † ⊗ I |χ〉
|φ′〉 = V † ⊗ I |φ〉 .
This becomes
LHS = max
U,V
max
|ψ〉
|〈ψ| (|χ′〉 〈χ′|+ |φ′〉 〈φ′|) |ψ〉| (C4)
= max
U,V
λmax(|χ′〉 〈χ′|+ |φ′〉 〈φ′|).
where λmax(A) is the maximum eigenvalue of A. Since
λmax (|χ′〉 〈χ′|+ |φ′〉 〈φ′|) = 1 + |〈χ′|φ′〉| . (C5)
we have
LHS = 1 +max
U,V
∣∣〈χ|UV † ⊗ I |φ〉∣∣ (C6)
= 1 + F (ω, σ),
where in the last step we have applied Uhlmann’s theo-
rem, Eq. (18). 
Next, we prove Eq. (21), i.e. that the density operator
ρ that achieves the maximum in Eq. (C1), is
ρopt =
ω + σ +
√
σU
√
ω +
√
ωU †
√
σ
2 (1 + F (σ, ω))
, (C7)
where
U =
∣∣√ω√σ∣∣−1√σ√ω. (C8)
We shall require the following lemma.
Lemma Consider two density operators, σ and ω defined
on a d dimensional Hilbert space H. Let H′ also
be a d dimensional Hilbert space. The state |φ〉 ∈
H′ ⊗H defined by
|φ〉 = (I ⊗√ω)
d∑
k=1
|ek〉 |fk〉 , (C9)
where {|ek〉}dk=1 is an orthonormal basis for H′ and
{|fk〉}dk=1 is an orthonormal basis for H′, is a pu-
rification of ω. Furthermore, any state of the form
|χ〉 = (I ⊗√σV ) d∑
k=1
|ek〉 |fk〉 , (C10)
where V is the unitary operator
V =
∣∣√ω√σ∣∣−1√σ√ω + Vnull(√ω√σ), (C11)
is a purification of σ that is maximally parallel to
|φ〉 . Note that |A| =
√
A†A, B−1 is the inverse of
B on its support, and Vnull(A) is any unitary trans-
formation on the null space of A. Note also that an
arbitrary phase factor could be incorporated into
|χ〉 .
Proof. It is easy to verify that |φ〉 and |χ〉 are indeed
purifications of ω and σ, since
TrH |φ〉 〈φ| =
d∑
k=1
√
ω |fk〉 〈fk|
√
ω
= ω,
and
TrH |χ〉 〈χ| =
d∑
k=1
√
σV |fk〉 〈fk|V †
√
σ
=
√
σV V †
√
σ
= σ,
where we have used the completeness of the {|fk〉} and
the unitarity of V. Second, |φ〉 and |χ〉 are maximally
parallel since
|〈φ|χ〉|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
〈fk|
√
ω
√
σV |fk〉
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣TrH (√σV√ω)∣∣
=
∣∣∣TrH (√σ [∣∣√ω√σ∣∣−1√σ√ω + Vnull(√ω√σ)
]√
ω
)∣∣∣
= TrH
∣∣√ω√σ∣∣
= F (ω, σ) .

We are now in a position to prove Eq. (C7). To begin,
note that the |ψ〉 that achieves the maximum in Eq. (C4)
is simply the eigenvector of |χ′〉 〈χ′|+ |φ′〉 〈φ′| associated
with the maximum eigenvalue,∣∣ψopt〉 = |χ′〉+ |φ′〉√
2
√
1 + |〈χ′|φ′〉| , (C12)
where we have chosen phases such that 〈χ′|φ′〉 is real.
The U and V that achieve the maximum in Eq. (C6)
are any pair Uopt, V opt such that∣∣〈χ|UoptV opt† ⊗ I |φ〉∣∣ = F (ω, σ). (C13)
which implies that the states |χ′〉 and |φ′〉 that are defined
in terms of a particular Uopt and V opt are maximally
parallel. A particular pair of purifications of σ and ω that
are maximally parallel is provided by lemma 2. Taking
Eqs. (C9) and (C10) to define |φ′〉 and |χ′〉 , we obtain
∣∣ψopt〉 = (I ⊗ (√ω +√σV ))∑dk=1 |ek〉 |fk〉√
2
√
1 + |〈χ′|φ′〉| , (C14)
This state allows one to achieve the maximum control.
Its reduced density operator on H is
ρopt = TrH′
∣∣ψopt〉 〈ψopt∣∣
=
(
√
ω +
√
σV )(
√
ω + V †
√
σ)
2 (1 + F (σ, ω))
=
ω + σ +
√
σV
√
ω +
√
ωV †
√
σ
2 (1 + F (σ, ω))
.
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Noting that
√
σVnull(
√
ω
√
σ)
√
ω =
√
ωVnull(
√
ω
√
σ)
√
σ = 0, we have the desired result.
